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THE IMPACT OF THE CONCEPTS OF
‘COMMON GOOD’, ‘JUSTICE’ AND ‘DIVERSITY’
IN THE NATURAL LAW OF OUR TIME
Ginés Marco1

realize the social nature of man and, to that extent,
contribute to manifesting what it is to be human.
an is, by nature, a social being. The
Now, family and city contribute -better or worseexperience that the human being tends to
to that end, to the extent that they promote or
society and needs it to live humanly is so clear and
not human development, according to the goods
permanent that it does not take a great speculative
that - following St. Thomas - are already targeted
effort to capture the natural character of human
in the very nature of man. Therefore, when we
sociability. This idea has seldom been denied
speak of family and city as “human” societies we
throughout the History of Philosophy. In fact, as
do not simply refer to the fact that they are made
John Stuart Mill (2001) states:
up of human beings, but rather
“The social state is at once so
to the fact that they realize and
natural, so necessary, and so
Just as every man is
must realize a specifically human
habitual to man that, except
way of life, and therefore are
human,
but
he
can
in some unusual circumstances
inherently ethical. Precisely the
always realize his
or by an effort of voluntary
latter explains that, when it comes
abstraction, he never conceives
humanity with greater
to characterizing them, we cannot
himself otherwise than as a
settle for factual explanations,
perfection, so every
member of a body”2(p. 32).
since the human, insofar as it is
human society is
Social life is not, then, in man, a
ethical, is not purely factual: it
mere factual issue. When we say
includes - as Ana Marta González
intrinsically ethical.
that man is social by nature we
(2008) affirms - always an original
do not mean only that in fact he
tension towards the order of
lives in association with others,
duty to be. Just as every man is
for more or less pragmatic reasons, of subsistence
human, but he can always realize his humanity
or reciprocal convenience3. Undoubtedly, human
with greater perfection, so every human society
society has much of this, but the sense of the wellis intrinsically ethical. This, however, does not
known Aristotelian affirmation - man is a political
prevent him from realizing his ethical condition
animal - is much deeper. This means that man
with greater perfection.
only comes to fully manifest his humanity, only
To better appreciate the intrinsically ethical
to develop his moral personality, to the extent
character of human society, as something that
that his life is received in the bosom of a human
distinguishes, this society from other animal
society: the family in the first place and, through it,
societies, we can use a valuable observation of
the political society.
Aristotle (2005), who saw a connection between

1. THE ETHICAL NATURE OF SOCIAL LIFE

M

In fact, according to the classical approach, family
and “polis” contribute, each in their own way, to
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the peculiar human sociability, language and
communication about what fair and unjust:
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The reason why man is a social being,
more than any bee and that any
gregarious animal, is evident: nature, as
we say, does nothing in vain, and man is
the only animal that has a word. For the
voice is a sign of pain and pleasure, and
that is why other animals also possess it,
because their nature reaches a sensation of
pain and pleasure and indicates it to each
other. But the word is to show what is
convenient and what is harmful, as well as
what is just and unjust, and other values,
and the community participation of these
things constitutes the home and the ‘polis’
(Aristotle, 2005: I, 2, 1253 a, 11-13: p. 4).
The word, unlike the voice, does not only serve to
manifest subjective states of pleasure and pain -as
is the case of animals- but also objective contents,
based on which a different type of community can
be constituted. Among those objective contents,
verbally communicable, Aristotle highlights those
that refer to the usefulness or convenience of
things for certain purposes, but also justice.
Indeed, as Aristotle (2005) explains elsewhere,
justice consists of a “certain equality”, or
proportional equality, which can be determined
by prudential judgment (p. 89). Now precisely,
justice as a virtue requires of man the willingness
to submit to such a judgment, even in the case that
such submission supposes contradicting the most
immediate particular interests. Man, precisely of
his possibility of escaping from the immediacy, is
radically different from other animals. And in this
also lies the greatest difference between animal and
human society.
Now, as we noted above, the properly human
social life is structured in different types of
communities, and it is not possible to dispense
with such structuring - as political liberalism
defends - without depriving man of essential
ethical referents for his practical life. As we know,
Aristotle himself refers to the family, the village
and the city - or political society proper - although
later he focuses almost exclusively on the analysis
of the house and the city. Among them, it detects
an essential difference, which should be kept in
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mind when reflecting on the just and the unjust in
the configuration of public life.

2. FAMILY AND POLIS
Adopting a genetic perspective, that is, a
perspective that deals with the former in the
temporal order, it would be necessary to say that
the house is prior to the city. However, adopting
a teleological perspective, by which we discover
the essentials of a reality in the form it presents
when it has been fully developed, we would have
to say the opposite, namely, that the city “precedes
the house and every one of us, because the whole
is necessarily prior to the part” (Aristotle, 2005,
p. 4). In fact, Aristotle understands that only by
reference to the common political good can man
discover and realize the good initiated in his own
nature. And, with everything, the same city cannot
be constituted without houses and families, “…
because every city is made up of houses” (Aristotle,
2005, p. 5). Therefore, all just order of the city
must begin by considering the nature and specific
contribution of the family to the constitution of
human good.
2.1. The necessary and the free
According to Aristotle (2005), the family is a
place of coexistence designed to satisfy the most
immediate needs of life, without which man can
hardly enter to form part of the political society
proper (p. 3). The trait presented by the family is
its imperfection because it lacks self-sufficiency,
in such a way that it is more constrained by the
necessary than by the free. On the other hand, the
characteristic object of political society is not so
much to satisfy the most immediate and urgent
needs of life, but rather to make a form of free
coexistence possible - in the sense of “liberated”
from what is necessary or not constrained by what
is necessary. For Aristotle, only the latter is an end
in itself, but this must be understood well.
Following Ana Marta González (2008), when
Aristotle suggests that only political coexistence,
insofar as it is a free coexistence, is an end in itself,
is not wanting to belittle the moral value of other
activities. Undoubtedly, being good in itself is a
feature of any morally good act: Aristotle (2009)
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himself says it more than once: “good deed is itself
an end” (p. 103). However, good deed is also an
integral part of an activity that is no longer, in
turn, a means to any other activity or activity other
than itself. As we know, this activity is designated
by Aristotle with a name, eudaimonia, and, as
we also know, Aristotle himself experienced a
hesitation in determining whether the eudaimonia
in question, the happy life, properly consisted in a
contemplative activity or had rather than looking
for it in political life, understood in the previous
terms: as a coexistence of free and equal.

decisions made with the sole criterion of
administering the goods and satisfying needs,
without further projection into the good life, are
ethically deviant. The fact that Aristotle confined
the Economy in the strict sense to the family has to
do with it: for Aristotle, the only natural place to
satisfy the needs of life is the family, and a family
only fulfills its function if it enables its members
to participate in a political community, formed by
free and equal principles.

According to Aristotle, a correct economy must
not lose sight of the fact that the satisfaction of
the necessities of life only are considered if they
contribute to reach the good life. In other words,
that the Economy as such is subordinated to
the Politics, and not vice versa. Consequently,

For the rest, the Aristotelian thesis according to
which the Economy is to be subordinated to the
Politics also extends to other matters. This allows
us to understand, for example, the criticism that
Aristotle (2005, p. 81) directs to all those who
“convert their activities into chrematistics”, that is,

The Aristotelian idea according to which the
Economy should be confined to the house has
been criticized a lot, mainly by the precursors
From this perspective, it is unquestionable that
of neoclassical economy. His
the free activity in itself is
position, however, is much
contemplation.
more understandable when we
…Politics,
understood
But immediately, then, human
approach the question from the
coexistence should be placed
as Aristotle does, as the
point of view of the subordination
not focused on satisfying needs,
coexistence of free and equal.
of the necessary to the free. From
nor on productive activities,
then on, it may not be necessary
That is to say: Economy finds
but purely and simply on living
to think that the Economy as
together in freedom -in which the
its ethical north when it is
such should be confined to the
allusion to the self-government
oriented
to
make
possible
the
house: it is enough to retain that,
of free men is implicit. Precisely
no matter where the economic
coexistence of free and equal.
for this reason, beyond his
activity is developed, it must not
determined commitment to
lose sight of its subordination to
contemplation as an essential
Politics, understood as Aristotle
activity of happiness absolutely
does,
as
the
coexistence
of free and equal. That
considered, Aristotle does not renounce to place in
is to say: Economy finds its ethical north when
the political life the content of human happiness.
it is oriented to make possible the coexistence of
Politics, in the Aristotelian sense of expression, is
free and equal. Now, there is a sense in which this
a uniquely human activity because it begins only
certainly directly implies a reference to the house:
where everywhere needs are met. In this sense
concretely, when we consider the most immediate
it reveals a first form of self-transcendence of
ethical horizon of the work activity. In effect:
man. Below the policy, still focused on the mere
work, for what it has of economic relationship,
satisfaction of needs - or, as the case may be, on
belongs more directly to the family relationship
the production of goods that are only ordered,
than to the political relationship, and therefore
more or less sophisticatedly to the satisfaction of
when it becomes independent of any relationship
needs - is Economy.
with the common good of the family, distortions
easily appear in the human life.
2.2. Economy and politics
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they subordinate all their activities to profit, since
such a thing supposes denaturalizing the activities.4
When this same thought is transferred to the
public service we talk about corruption.
In another order of things, this way of
approaching the relationship between Economy
and Politics supposes that the Politics has a
positive content -the coexistence between free and
equal men- and that such content does not appear
by the mere fact of having common commercial
interests or ensuring the reciprocal rights.
Indeed, according to Aristotle (2005):
the ‘polis’ is not a community of place to
prevent reciprocal injustices and with a
view to exchange. These things, without
a doubt, are necessarily given if the
city exists, but not because all of them
exist, there is already a city, but this is
a community of houses and families to
live well, with the aim of a perfect and
autarchic life. (p. 81)
According to such words, what is distinctive about
the political relationship itself is that it revolves
not simply around life, but around the good life.
Thus, Aristotle clearly distinguishes the domesticeconomic and political. Accordingly, neither the
conjugal relationship, nor the paternal-subsidiary,
nor the sheriff -between the master and the slaveare political relations. Nor is the artisan and the
apprentice. Unlike all these relationships -defined
by some kind of need-, only the relations between
free and equal -so the relationships not marked
by daily needs or economic interests- are properly
speaking political relations. What defines the
political perspective, therefore, is the consideration
of men as free and equal, without prejudice to
other differences that undoubtedly occur between
them when things are considered from another
perspective.
2.3. Justice and politics
The way to realize the political perspective is
the introduction of considerations of justice,
since justice is defined, precisely, as “a certain
equality” (Aristotle, 2005, p. 81). Certainly, it is
not a strict equality, but proportional. And, as
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we know, Aristotle distinguishes two types of
proportion: the arithmetic, which must govern the
modes of treatment between individuals, and the
geometric, which must govern the distributions
of charges and benefits according to merit, all
under the protection of the law that, founding
the notion of legal justice, is directly ordered to
protect the common good. Indeed, according to
Aristotle (2005), “…the political good is justice,
that is, what is convenient for the community”
(p. 81), but such political justice only “…exists
between people who share a common life to make
autarchy possible, free and equal persons, already
proportional and arithmetically” (Aristotle, 2009,
p. 90).
From the Aristotelian approach we can infer
that the prospering of political relations are
only possible if, above the possible relations of
economic dependence that are established between
men, as well as their different economic benefits
to the community, they are all recognized as
equal before the law, simply because all of them
contribute in some measure with their actions and
their judgment, to a different kind of coexistence,
no longer governed in this case by necessity or
utility. Determining to what extent they contribute
to it is a matter of justice, and this kind of justice
is what is safeguarded by law, which, according to
Aristotle (2005) “is the middle ground” (p. 203).
This does not mean that the Policy is exhausted in
the enactment of laws. However, legislation is an
essential part of the Policy. Aristotle (2009) says
of the laws that “…come to be the works of the
Policy” (p. 202), because they introduce order in
the whole of the coexistence, defining the limits
beyond of which the common good is violated, or
seriously attacked against others.
In any case, with the introduction of the political
perspective, obviously, it is not about annulling
the differences that persist among citizens from
other points of view, nor is it about considering the
different contributions they give to the community
from their fields irrelevant respective. It is only
about recognizing that, above or below, each and
every one of these services, they are all equal as
citizens.
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In the latter, as pointed out above, the political
community is clearly distinguished from the family
community, since the latter is not a community
of free and equal, because it is essentially marked
by the satisfaction of needs. Basically, the spouses
need each other and the children need their
parents. Certainly, when they come of age, they
are all equal before the law. But within the family
community there is no equality but difference,
and precisely because of this detail the relations
that exist between them are not political either.
Consequently, among them “…there can be no
political justice of one respect to the others, but
only justice in a certain sense and by analogy”
(Aristotle, 2009, p. 202).
In fact, “…there is justice... for those whose
relationships are regulated by a law” (Aristotle,
2009, p. 91). However, according to Aristotle,
only “…those who are equal in command and
in obedience…” (2009, p. 92) have a natural
law.5 Such a thing is in principle possible within
the political community - and that is precisely
the notion of citizenship; it is not, however, in
the case of family relationships, where parents
naturally have authority over their children. For
this reason, only in the case of the relationship
between husband and wife does Aristotle admit a
certain concept of justice, domestic justice, which,
however, is also distinguished from political justice
itself.
Certainly, in the case of family relations it seems
that justice is little and friendship should be
better talked about. At the end of the day, “…
when men are friends (Aristotle, 2009, p. 143),
there is no need for justice, while even if they are
righteous, they also need friendship”. And yet,
it is also true that, according to all appearances,
“it is the righteous who are most capable of
friendship” (Aristotle, 2009, p. 142), and “…it is
natural that justice grows together with friendship,
since both occur in the same and have the same
extension” (Aristotle, 2009, p. 153). In any case,
friendship requires a community of life: without
this, friendship cannot develop, and that is why
the different types of communities are at the base
of the different types of friendship. Thus, next to
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a friendship based on superiority - as occurs, for
example, between parents and children - there is
a civic friendship, like the one that must be given
between free and equal citizens.
2.4. Complementarity between family and polis in
education
As we can see, it is important not to confuse
or separate the family logic and the political
logic, since these are two different entities. The
distinction between them, however, does not
exclude their complementarity. On the contrary,
family logic and political logic are reciprocally
complementary if we consider things in relation to
the ultimate goal of ethics: to make a man a good
man.
In fact, in order to reach this purpose, it is
necessary that the child receives the appropriate
education from a young age, in such a way that
later, in his adult age, he lives “given to good
occupations”, and does not do “neither against
his will not voluntarily what is bad” (Aristotle,
2009, p. 199). All of this, however, “…will not
be possible except for those who live according
to a certain intelligence and a right order that
has strength” (Aristotle, 2009, p. 200). And it is
precisely at this point that there is an aspect of
that complementarity between family and politics
that is necessary for the attainment of human life,
because, as Aristotle (2009) observes, “the father’s
orders have no force or obligation, nor do they
generally of no isolated man, unless he is a king or
something similar; on the other hand, the law has
obligatory force and is the expression of a certain
prudence and intelligence” (p. 200).
Aristotle considers that family and polis contribute
-each in its own way- to the realization of the
human good, that is, that every man becomes a
good man, which supposes, among other things,
the formation for political life. Certainly, Aristotle
(2009) also observes that if the city neglects these
questions, “…it must correspond to each one to
direct his children and his friends to virtue, and to
be able to do it, or at least propose it” (p. 201). In
reality, this task is always the special competence
of parents and friends, because by their proximity
and closeness they are in a better position to be
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right in particular cases. All in all, his opinion
is that he will be better able to deal with each
individual case, who knows in general what is
convenient for everyone, and in principle, this
is the legislator, although this knowledge is also
convenient for parents and educators.
In fact, although the father and the educator
attend first to the good of the individual, insofar
as the human individual is not perfected but by
reference to the political community in which he
lives, this implies that the educational task will not
be successful unless you have the common good
before your eyes. On the other hand, although the
legislator must first attend to the common good, he
must not lose sight of the fact that said common
good, in order to be so, must be perfective of
the individual man and that, for that reason, its
provisions on education (Aristotle, 2009, p. 84),
will have to act in accordance with human nature.
Undoubtedly, given that the legislator’s work
inevitably involves interference in the moral life of
the individual, it is important to have a criterion
that distinguishes education from manipulation
or corruption, and this criterion, implicit in all
practical reasoning, is none other than nature.
Indeed, as Aristotle (2009) says, “it is not the same
to be a good man and be a good citizen of any
regime” (p. 84), because there are corrupt regimes
that enact laws in line with the regime and whose
corruption, however, is recognizable, precisely
because they violate the natural basis of human
coexistence - what we might call the natural
sense of justice, which is not only relative to the
determined political regime, but not completely
alien to it either.

3. NATURAL AND LEGAL LAW
According to Aristotle (2009), natural law is
distinguished from legal law, but it conforms to
what we call political right. Thus, he writes, “…
political justice is divided into natural and legal;
natural, which has the same force everywhere,
regardless of whether it looks like it or not, and
legal that of what, at first does not matter what it
is or otherwise, but that once established no longer
gives the same” (p. 92).
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As we see in the words of Aristotle, natural
law appears as part of the political right. It is,
therefore, a present and operative right in the
polis, between free and equal citizens. It is not a
pre-political right, as an abstract code that should
be looked at when promulgating the legal right
or examining its justice; but it is a right implicit
in the practical reasoning of man historically
situated and that, nevertheless, is distinguished by
its origin from the purely legal right. We could say
that, in the absence of ideological conditioning or
tyrannical partisanship, the legal right for Aristotle
is limited to specifying or determining the limits of
the just and unjust in a given society. By doing this,
it already incorporates the provisions of natural
law. This thought is also implicit in the Thomist
thesis according to which one must always judge
according to written laws:
Judgment is nothing other than a certain
definition or determination of what is
just; but a thing is made fair in two ways:
either by its very nature, what is called
natural right, or by a certain convention
among men, what is called positive law
... Laws, however, are written for the
declaration of both rights, although in a
different way. For the written law contains
the natural right, but does not institute
it, since it does not take force from the
law but from nature: but the writing of
the law contains and institutes positive
law, giving it the force of authority. That
is why it is necessary that the judgment
be made on the written law, because
otherwise the trial would depart from the
natural right, or from the just positive.
(Aquinas, 2009, p. 3.263)
In that text, St. Thomas opportunely distinguishes
between the institution of law and its presence or
use by man. There is no doubt that, from this last
perspective, the citizen as soon uses the natural
right as the positive one. In fact, it would have
to be said that, ordinarily, whenever the citizen
uses positive law, he also makes use of the natural
right. However, this does not mean that the source
of both rights is the same, or that they have been
instituted in the same way. For while the legal or
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positive right takes its force and its origin from
the convention of men, natural law takes its force
and its origin from nature - that is, from natural
reason, from reason that takes charge of the endsgoods to which our inclinations point. Therefore,
in the response to the first objection of the same
article, St. Thomas observes:
Just as the written law does not give
force to natural law, neither can it be
diminished or taken away from it, since
the will of man cannot change nature.
Therefore, if the written law contains
something against the natural right, it is
unjust, and has no force to bind, because
the positive law is only applicable when
it is indifferent to the natural right that
a thing be done in one way or another ...
Hence, such scriptures are not called laws,
but rather corruptions of the law, and,
therefore, should not be judged according
to them. (Aquinas, 2009, p. 3.264)
St. Thomas is obviously thinking of the “wicked
laws”. This name is reserved, precisely, to the laws
that contradict the natural right “or always or
in the largest number of cases” (Aquinas, 2009,
p. 3.265). Now, as he himself observes, it would
also go against the natural right in case we insist
on observing a written law that in principle is
just, but that, applied to a specific case, in which
special circumstances occur, it is not.6 St. Thomas
refers to those cases whose right judgment requires
the exercise of equity or epikeia. This virtue is
not a different virtue of justice itself, but it does
represent a higher form of justice than legal justice,
since it is introduced precisely to correct the
possible effect derived from applying the written
law in certain cases.
Equity or epikeia had been referred to by Aristotle
in similar terms:
Equitable is fair, but not in the sense of the
law, but as a rectification of legal justice. The
reason for this is that the law is universal, and
there are things that cannot be treated correctly
in a universal way. Therefore, when the law is
universally expressed and something that is outside
the universal formulation emerges, then it is fine,
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where the legislator does not reach and errs by
simplifying, correcting the omission, what the
legislator himself would have said if he had been
there and would have stated in the law if he had
known. That is why fairness is fair, and better than
a kind of justice; not absolute justice, but the error
produced by its absolute nature. (Aquinas, 2009,
p. 3.285)
Well, the very fact that we can discuss the justice
or injustice derived from applying a law in
principle just to a given case is indicative that legal
justice is not the last word in matters of justice.
As Robert Spaemann (1973) has warned, the fact
that it is relevant to discuss the justice or injustice
of a positive law, legally promulgated, responds
to the fact that the interlocutors know that there
is something that is just in itself, even though it is
sometimes recognized by the power established
and others not. Whoever really accepted legal
positivism would close to himself the possibility of
participating in this type of debate after the entry
into force of a law.
In fact, the existence of equity is an indirect
confirmation of the existence of a natural right
not always introduced in a code, but operative.
That natural right is that we use spontaneously in
all those cases not yet covered by the legal right,
and that often lead us to speak -as Ana Marta
González (2008) points out- of “legal vacuums”
and demand a codification.
Thus, natural law, as understood by Aristotle and
Thomas Aquinas, is not an ahistorical right, but is
called to materialize and take a specific historical
form through its positivization in different legal
codes, to the extent that said Codes actually
pursue introducing order in relationships that
occur between members of a given community.
This is so because whatever is fair in such
relationships cannot be determined absolutely
a priori. This is followed by words of Aristotle
(2009) that would otherwise be truly obscure: “for
us there is a natural justice, and yet all justice is
variable: nevertheless, there is a natural and a nonnatural justice. But it is clear which of the things
that can be otherwise is natural and which is not
natural but legal or conventional, although both
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are equally mutable” (p. 92).
Despite writing shortly before, in the same
place, that “what is by nature is immutable
and has everywhere the same force, just as fire
burns both here and in Persia”, Aristotle has no
objection to accept that “all justice is variable”.
St. Thomas is not far behind, and so he writes in
his commentary: “among men, who are among
the corruptible, was added to the physical nature
a second nature, in essential level or by accident”
(Aquinas, 1987, p. 240), which does not prevent
him from affirming the existence of a natural
right that is valid for all men. The only way to
understand both statements together is to note,
on the one hand, that the definition of man as a
social animal involves admitting as many positive
realizations of human nature as there are social
forms throughout history. And notice, on the
other hand, that this does not nullify the idea of 
natural law, which lasts, precisely, as a negative
criterion: there are actions that, no matter what
the historical determinations of human nature,
nor what the reasons are about the most useful for
human coexistence, they can never be considered
natural, because, far from constituting a concretion
of something that nature leaves indeterminate,
they involve a direct contradiction to the goods
that we recognize positively initiated in our natural
inclinations.
As inheritor of modernity, we can feel the impulse
to complete the classic doctrine of natural
law with a clear affirmation of the dignity of
the human person, which excludes any purely
instrumental consideration of the human being
and allows, therefore, to recognize everything
biologically human as subject of political and
social rights. This thought was introduced in the
modern age with the different theories of natural
rights, and codified later in the later universal
declarations of human rights. Among the initiators
of this revolutionary idea, there were many
who appealed to biblical and Christian sources
from which, in their opinion, the appropriate
consequences had not been extracted. This is
the case of the voluntarist thesis of Duns Scoto
(1987) and William of Ockham (1990). These two
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authors rewrite the biblical and Christian sources
about the foundations of legal rules.
However, progress in this direction has suffered
an abrupt reversal in our time, with the denial of
such rights to the unborn, despite their biologically
human condition. Likewise, the loss of the
classical context of natural law, with its definition
of the minimum framework of the common
good, has meant the introduction of a dangerous
misunderstanding in the use of human rights that,
in our days, are invoked to defend a thing as the
opposite. From this last point we have a clear
example in the debate about euthanasia: when we
start talking about the right to death in the same
plane of the right to life, we appeal to a highly
individualistic conception of law that, ultimately,
threatens by its base all the legal order.
Indeed, assuming that any individual desire
must find an echo in the legal system, the latter
automatically ceases to be the guarantor of
the common good to become the arbitrator
of supposed individual benefits. However, this
movement is far from being harmless, because it
involves the denial of a common human good,
of which life, but not death, is an integral and
essential part: a common good by reference to
which some decisions are more just than others.
Now, precisely because life, but not death, is
an integral part of the common human good,
when an alleged right to death is invoked, it is
assumed that there is no common good, or that the
common good does not have any objective content
at all; it is assumed, in short, that there are only
subjective visions or individual interests, more or
less changing, that can be tilted as much by life as
by death; and that the task of the public powers is
to arbitrate between such preferences or interests,
although to give greater solemnity to the political
task appeals to a supposed “general interest”.
This worldview can be sustained, in theory, on
the basis of an extreme liberalism that disguises
as love of individual freedom the lack of love for
one’s own life or that of others as soon as it does
not meet certain conditions of quality. In practice,
it involves introducing a genuine investment
of values: once the presumed right to death is
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accepted in the legal system, or - without going so
far - once euthanasia is decriminalized, any patient
whose care requires a considerable effort on the
part of his relatives is defenseless against the social
pressure that more or less tacitly encourages him
to request euthanasia and, in this way, free his
beloved relatives from the cumbersome task of
caring for him. Whoever, in view of the efforts
of the family or the state, would not choose to
die would be labeled as selfish. With this, the
investment of securities is complete.
4. Current Questions Around the Common Good
To the extent that the process of modernization
involves a process of individualization, the notion
of the common good tends to disappear from
the ethical horizon of the agent. This follows a
remarkable impoverishment of human life, because
man only reaches its characteristic fullness to the
extent that it relates to their peers and founds a
community based on the word, in the conversation
about the just and the unjust, what is useful and
what is harmful.
Indeed, the properly human community exists
only insofar as the word is not simply a rhetorical
instrument at the service of particular interests,
but a means to communicate the true and the
just. Hence, relativism threatens by its base any
properly human form of coexistence. Where
the interest for the truth fades, other interests
flourish, which are not capable of founding open
communities. But-someone could object-: does the
truth found open communities? Are there other
alternatives? In the following sections we will try
to answer these questions.
4.1. Fundamentalism and relativism
The term “fundamentalist”, as we use it in
this study, has no particular transcendental
connotations. Rather, in etymological key,
“fundamentalist” is anyone who adheres to
the foundations, but refuses to develop them
rationally, gathering from others a nod not
justified with reasons. Developing the foundations,
in effect, is the work of reason, because this is
a discursive power, whose most proper task is
certainly to move from principles to conclusions
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and conclusions to principles. Such a discourse is
called “science” when we move on the theoretical
plane, and “prudence” when we move on the
practical plane. From this perspective, what defines
fundamentalism is more the renunciation of or the
inability to rationally articulate one’s convictions,
than the fact that such convictions are of a
religious nature.
Now, from this point of view, the relativist
himself is also a type of fundamentalist. For the
relativist may have his reasons, but in thinking
that each one also has his or her own, and also
assuming that no one has to be in principle more
relevant than the others, indirectly raises his own
relativism to a single relevant reason. From here,
its only difference with the fundamentalist is
only of a practical and provisional nature. Thus,
while the fundamentalist does not renounce in
principle to assert his ideas in a violent way, the
relativist seems to reject in principle such recourse
to violence. However, its denying of the truth
also implies a violence to the nature of things: if
no opinion can be, in principle, moretrue than
the opposite, then the use of the word loses all
communicating virtuality in a double sense:
neither communicates anything true nor founds
true community. Under these conditions, the use
of the word can only have a rhetorical purpose: to
persuade the other of my opinions and, ultimately,
of my interests. Relativism thus becomes an excuse
for the strongest to dominate the weakest.
Faced with both positions, it is important to
emphasize the rationality of the classical approach,
for which there can only be community if there are
shared reasons, of which some are conventional,
while others are natural. The classic doctrine of
natural law, in effect, constitutes an undeniable
framework when finding shared reasons.
Certainly, as a moral doctrine and not just a legal
one, the doctrine of natural law covers more things
than natural law. Thus, although St. Thomas
takes up the classical doctrine of natural law, in
his brief exposition of the goods associated with
rational inclination, one can call attention to a
peculiar aspect, which is not equally emphasized
in that approach: the duty to avoid ignorance
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and, therefore, to seek the truth. This duty is
a requirement that makes us the natural law
and that cannot be translated into legal terms.
However, that requirement of natural law is at the
base of the same legal system because, if the search
for truth lapses, social life easily falls prey to
considerations of another type - purely pragmatic
and, in the last analysis, balances of power. We
thus enter into the vicious circle characteristic of
the relativist society, because it is a fact that the
duty to seek the truth can also be stimulated or, on
the contrary, weakened, as a consequence of the
appreciation or lack of public appreciation for the
truth.
At the same time, the fact that St. Thomas
speaks of the truth as something that must be
sought supposes admitting a right to search, and,
therefore, to the freedom to search. Faced with
fundamentalist positions, which require a nonargumentative recognition of a body of truths, it
must be remembered that political life, in the strict
sense, although it certainly presupposes an interest
in truth, as something of a natural law, does not
suppose more shared than those that are known as
“natural right”.
Certainly, historical development can lead to a
concrete community building its social life on a
broader and deeper body of truths and, insofar
as such truths are assimilated and incorporated
into the way of life, they will become part of the
common law not written, which is as much as
saying a natural right in a derivative sense. Indeed,
asked if natural law can change, St. Thomas
Aquinas (2009) answers:
…change can be conceived in two ways:
first, because something is added to it. And
in that sense, nothing prevents the natural
law from changing, because in fact there
are many useful provisions for human life
that have been added to the natural law,
both by divine law and, even, by human
laws. (p. 3.632)
It is implicit in these words that the progress of
human law, in so far as it is just and oriented
towards the common good, can be considered as a
natural law.

JoVSA • Volume 3, Issue 2 • Fall 2018

But historical development can also lead to a
change in this last aspect. Thus, asked if human
law can change, St. Thomas answers:
Human law is an opinion of reason,
according to which, human acts are
directed. Hence, to legitimately change
it, there can be two reasons: one on the
part of reason and the other on the part
of men whose acts the law regulates.
On the part of reason, because it seems
innate to human reason to gradually
advance from the imperfect to the perfect
... and thus we see ... that the first ones
that tried to discover something useful
for the constitution of human society,
not being able to take it all into account,
they established imperfect norms and full
of gaps, which were later modified and
replaced by others with less deficiencies
in the service of the common good. In
turn, on the part of the men whose acts
it regulates, the law can be legitimately
modified by the change of human
conditions, which in their differences
require different approaches. (Aquinas,
2009, p. 3.664)
According to these words, it seems clear that
not every change in the legislation is illegitimate:
although it is true that there are irrational and
unjust changes, because they do not serve the
common good, there are others that may be
necessary when there are notable changes in the
constitution of the population, perhaps because
people from other traditions and with stronger
convictions than the indigenous community are
incorporated into the community. In these cases, a
redefinition of public order seems inevitable which
has as an immutable point of reference the natural
law.
4.2. Universalism and culturalism
Broadly speaking, the conflict can be defined in the
following terms: while the universalist maintains
that there are universal reasons that can be shared
by all, regardless of their cultural origin, the
culturalist objects that these universal reasons are
universal only in appearance, since that, in reality,
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they are the fruit of a particular culture. In this
case, the particular culture is referred to as Western
culture.
It should be noted that the culturalist-who is
nothing but a cultural relativist-argues from a
theoretical position that to a large extent derives
its strength from the substantivization of the
concept of culture. That is to say, it argues as if
culture were a static reality, as if it were not a
practical reality configured and configurable along
the lines of theoretical and practical solutions of a
given human community to the various challenges
that nature or history poses.
However, precisely the coexistence of people of
diverse cultural origin in the same society, as well
as the presence of diverse cultural communities
under the same political framework, constitutes
an unprecedented practical challenge for all those
involved: for those people and their communities,
as well as for the indigenous cultural community.
The fact that it is a practical challenge makes
secondary the conflict between universalism and
culturalism, as has been stated above in terms
of theory. For from a practical point of view the
question is no longer whether cultural minorities
can or cannot share universal ideas of justice, or
if they have other ideas of justice, but purely and
simply under what conditions can we live in such a
way that we do not offend each other reciprocally
and do not live as strangers among us. That is,
how to build a community beyond our differences.
Additionally, at this point we consider that
without a minimum reference to human nature,
as well as to the goods that belong to the
integrity of that nature, it is not possible to forge
a reciprocal understanding between members
of diverse cultures. For which a very nuanced
notion of universalism will be needed, but not
to the uprooted way as it has sometimes been
posed by some sector of the doctrine but rather
as a universalism rooted in the very dynamics of
socially situated human life and appealing from
the beginning to a practical rationality.
In any case, the law that provides the framework
for coexistence is guided by a basic criterion
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pointed out by Thomas Aquinas: “not to offend
those with whom one has to converse” (2009,
p. 3.631). It is well understood that, beyond
its diverse cultural achievements, the minimum
guidelines of what constitutes an offense are found
in nature itself, and that this same nature asks us
to develop a sense of community.

5. PLURALISM AND NATURAL LAW
Precisely because man only realizes his nature
to the extent that he participates freely and
responsibly in that conversation that is at the base
of the common good, any position that endangers
that conversation constitutes a threat to the
common good and, ultimately, to man himself.
Without a doubt, it is necessary to participate in
the conversation about what is just and unjust
and, nevertheless, to violate the common good.
Any disobedience of the law constitutes such
a threat and, otherwise, any attack against the
special justice, that is, any attack against the men
with whom one has to converse, is also an offense
- albeit indirect - to the common benefit.
But the characteristic of the present moment is
not reflected so much in these types of attacks
against justice as in the very questioning of the
conversation without which we cannot even
speak of the common good. Above, we referred
to individualism and relativism as threats to that
conversation. While individualism designates a
sociological reality, relativism designates a cultural
reality. At the political level, the confluence of both
phenomena translates into the development of a
moral pluralism that undermines the possibility of
a true political community. From here we could
only speak of associations with a view to exchange
or to guarantee reciprocal rights.
As Zygmunt Bauman (1997) has indicated,
fundamentalism can be considered a reaction
to the risks implicit in these two threats,
which deprive the individual of all community
and philosophical support. However, the
fundamentalist reaction is also a threat, and
serious, against the constituent conversation of
social life, simply because one way or another
comes to consider it superfluous. In the latter,
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fundamentalism betrays its fundamental
incompatibility with politics. In its desire
to counteract the solvent moral pluralism,
fundamentalism comes to deny the legitimate
political pluralism.
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Stuart Mill, J. (2001). Utilitarianism [orig.: 1863].
Kitchener, Ontario: Batoche Books, p. 32.

2

As Aristotle argues: “It has been said in the first
exhibitions... that man is by nature a political animal,
and, therefore, even without needing reciprocal help,
men tend to coexist. However, the common utility
also unites them, insofar as each one encourages
participation in the good life. This is, in effect, the
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main purpose, both of all in common and in isolation.
But they also meet by mere living, and constitute the
political community. For perhaps in the mere fact of
living there is a certain part of the good, if in life the
penalties do not predominate too much. It is evident that
most men endure many sufferings because of their lively
desire to live, as if there were a certain happiness and
natural sweetness in life” (2005: III, 6, 1278 b 3, p. 77).
Alasdair MacIntyre will use in his work After virtue
(1981), the expression “external goods” to refer to those
goods that, because they are common to many practices,
can denaturalize the genuine meaning of a practice,
which only it is enriched if its participants use the socalled “internal goods”.

4

“A citizen without any other rank is better defined
than by participating in judicial functions and in
government” Aristotle (2005: III, 1, 1275 b, p. 69).
For that reason, Aristotle says that being a citizen
is an indefinite magistracy, which is above all true
of democratic regimes. “But the definition of citizen
admits a correction; in the other regimes, the indefinite
magistrate is not a member of the assembly and judge,
but rather a determined magistracy; because all these
or some of them have been entrusted with the power to
deliberate and judge on all matters or on some. After
this it is clear who the citizen is: who has the possibility
of participating in the deliberative or judicial function,
we call that citizen of that city; and we call the city, to
put it briefly, the set of such citizens enough to live with
self-sufficiency” (2005: III, 1, 1275 b 12, p.69).

5

“Just as iniquitous laws by themselves contradict
natural law, or always or in the greatest number of cases,
in the same way laws that are rightly established are
deficient in some cases, in which, if observed, it would
go against the natural right. And therefore, in such cases,
should not be judged according to the literality of the
law, but should be resorted to equity, which tends the
legislator. Hence, the Judge says: “Neither the reason
of right nor the benignity of equity suffer that what has
been introduced in the interest of men is interpreted too
harshly against their benefit, leading to severity. In such
cases, even the legislator himself would judge otherwise,
and if he had foreseen it he would have determined it in
the law” (Aquinas, 2009: II, II, q. 60, to 5 ad 2, p. 3.265)

6

JoVSA • Volume 3, Issue 2 • Fall 2018

The Impact of the Concepts of ‘Common Good’, ‘Justice’ and ‘Diversity’
in the Natural Law of Our Time

64

